This paper proposes a new measure of strategy distinctiveness for hedge funds, termed the Dispersion Contribution Index (DCI). This measure is based on a fund's return-distance from the mean return of same-style funds. We find that funds with more distinctive strategies tend to underperform relative to their less distinctive peers, after accounting for their idiosyncratic characteristics. This relative underperformance stems primarily from the higher risk exposure associated with pursuing a unique strategy. Our findings are robust to a wide array of additional tests.
Introduction
Hedge funds charge investors high fees on the expectation of delivering superior performance. This superior performance is typically believed to be driven by fund managers possessing unique skills that allow them to pursue unique investment ideas. However, the extent to which fund managers pursue distinctive investment strategies and, more importantly, whether these strategies lead to improved performance remains an open empirical question. In this paper, we propose a new measure of strategy distinctiveness based on a fund's return-distance from its cohort, 1 and we examine whether higher levels of strategy distinctiveness are associated with superior performance after accounting for the fund's risk exposure.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of hedge fund performance. Generally, existing empirical evidence suggests that the performance of funds with certain characteristics tends to be consistently better than that of other funds. For instance, Aragon (2007) finds that longer lockup periods are driving improved performance, possibly because they allow funds the flexibility to hold more illiquid assets and earn an illiquidity premium (see also Schaub and Schmid, 2013 , for the effect of liquidity on fund performance). A number of studies have found that superior performance is significantly associated with various other fund characteristics, such as lower exposure to systematic risk (Titman and Tiu, 2011), higher watermarks and greater managerial incentives (Agarwal et al., 2009 ), smaller size (Clare et al., 2015) , lower age (Boyson, 2008) , higher exposure to sentiment risk (Chen et al., 2016 ), higher maximum return over a fixed interval (Bali et al., 2015) , greater geographical proximity to investments (Teo, 2009), higher managerial education level (Li et al, 2011) , and greater adoption of quantitative versus qualitative methods (Chincarini, 2014) .
Out of the various fund characteristics, we would expect that one that is especially likely to be associated with performance is strategy distinctiveness. However, despite the apparent importance of this relationship, the empirical effect of strategy distinctiveness on performance has received somewhat limited attention. In the relatively few studies that have examined this topic, the evidence seems to suggest that funds with more distinctive strategies tend to outperform their less distinctive peers. For instance, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) construct a measure of strategy distinctiveness, termed Active Share, based on the proportion of a fund's holdings that are different from the holdings included in their respective benchmark (passive) index. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) , then, document a strong positive relationship between a fund's Active Share measure and its alpha, indicating that unique strategies tend to lead to superior performance after accounting for risk.
In a more recent study, Sun et al. (2012) propose an alternative measure of strategy distinctiveness based on the correlation between the time-series of a fund's historical returns and the mean returns of its cohort. This measure, termed the Strategy Distinctiveness Index (SDI), is reported to be significantly positively related to fund performance, leading Sun et al. (2012) to conclude that funds which pursue more unique strategies tend to outperform their less distinctive peers (similarly to the findings of Cremers and Petajisto, 2009 ).
In contrast, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) focus on the technology bubble and report that the effect of strategy distinctiveness on hedge fund performance was not unconditionally positive but, instead, depended on the stage of the bubble. In particular, they find that skilled managers of equity funds performed well by riding the bubble along with less skilled investors, suggesting that strategy uniformity, rather than distinctiveness, pays off during bubble formation. However, these skilled managers subsequently distanced themselves from the "herd" by reducing their positions in technology stocks and, thus, avoiding the losses incurred by most other investors.
We propose the distance of a fund's return from the mean return of its cohort (scaled by the mean distance among all the cohort's funds) as a new measure of strategy distinctiveness, and we label this measure the fund's Dispersion Contribution Index (DCI). We argue that the DCI can serve as a useful measure of strategy distinctiveness for several reasons. First, a fund manager can only substantiate her claim of delivering value through unique strategies by offering returns that deviate from those offered by her peers. In this sense, the distance of the fund's returns from the mean of same-style funds is a natural candidate for a measure that intuitively captures strategy distinctiveness based on the strategy's outcome. Second, our proposed measure can be easily computed using data on fund returns that are readily available, as opposed to data on fund holdings (e.g. as required to compute the Active Share measure) which, in the majority of cases, are not disclosed by fund managers. Third, computing the DCI of a fund at time t only requires returns data in the cross-section of its peers at t, in contrast, for instance, to the Sun et al. (2012) SDI that requires historical data over a window of previous returns in order to compute correlations. As a result, the DCI has the advantage of not having to select a specific length for the window of returns that are assumed to be relevant when computing strategy distinctiveness at t. Fourth, and arguably most important, our empirical results indicate that the DCI is strongly related to fund performance, even after accounting for the information contained in a fund's SDI. In this sense, our proposed DCI measure seems to be capturing information about a fund's strategy distinctiveness that is incremental, and to some extent in contrast, to the informational content of the commonly adopted SDI measure.
We find a wide dispersion and evidence of a positively skewed distribution of DCI levels in the cross-section of hedge funds. The DCI for the majority of funds is less than 1 while a small number of funds have particularly high DCI levels. Furthermore, the DCI of an individual fund is found to be considerably persistent over time. The DCI appears to be significantly related to other fund characteristics, with higher DCI levels being more likely to be observed in funds with higher return volatility, longer redemption notice and lock up periods, higher performance fees, lower age and higher leverage.
More importantly, our results cast substantial doubt on the previously reported findings of strategy distinctiveness leading to improved fund performance. On the one hand, we find that funds with the highest (lowest) DCI indeed offer the highest (lowest) net returns and Fung and Hsieh (2001) alphas. On the face of it, this finding seems to suggest that greater strategy distinctiveness leads to higher returns, even after accounting for the fund's exposure to a set of commonly used systematic factors. However, when we account for other sources of risk and other fund-specific characteristics, we find strong evidence of more distinctive funds underperforming relative to their less distinctive peers.
More specifically, we report a significantly negative and economically large Treynor and Black (1973) Appraisal Ratio (AR) earned by a spread portfolio that goes long in the quintile of highest DCI funds and short in the quintile of lowest DCI funds (essentially betting on strategy distinctiveness). Given that the AR is a scaled version of a fund's alpha by its volatility, the previously reported higher alphas offered by more distinctive funds seem to come at the cost of substantially higher idiosyncratic risk, with the overall risk-return trade-off being worse compared to that of funds with lower DCI levels. The relative underperformance of funds with the highest DCI levels is further supported by the finding that they offer significantly lower Omega and Sortino ratios compared to the lowest-DCI funds. Since these two performance measures are based on the lower partial moments of the returns' distribution, our results could indicate that managers who are skilled enough to implement unique strategies are exploiting the option-like features of their compensation contracts by increasing downside risk in pursuit of extremely high returns. Funds with the most distinctive strategies are also found to underperform relative to funds that follow less unique strategies based on their Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure (proposed by Ingersoll et al., 2007) . Finally, this negative relationship between strategy distinctiveness and fund performance holds across several different re-balancing periods for the quintile portfolios, ranging from one month to two years.
The results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of performance measures against fund-specific characteristics further confirm the negative relationship betwen distinctiveness and performance. When fund-specific characteristics are taken into account, a fund's performance is found to be significantly negatively related to its DCI. This result also holds when performance is based on the Fung and Hsieh (2001) alphas, suggesting that the initially reported positive relationship between alphas and the DCI was most likely driven by other fund characteristics rather than reflecting a fundamentally positive effect of strategy distinctiveness on fund performance.
In order to better understand the relationship between the DCI and performance, we conduct a battery of additional tests. First, we examine the DCI's incremental informational content relative to the Sun et al. (2012) SDI by doublesorting funds into portfolios based on their DCI and SDI. Second, we explore the effect of managers' skills in timing the market return (Chen and Liang, 2007) and timing the market liquidity (Cao et al., 2013) on the distinctiveness-performance relationship. To address the issue of DCI persistence, we re-sort portfolios based on a fund's mean DCI over the previous months. Given that our results are based on the Joenvaara et al. (2014) classification of funds in style clusters, we explore the effect of different ways to group funds by using the original BarclayHedge style categories and by performing an alternative k-means clustering. We also compare results from equally-weighting to those from value-weighting funds within particular portfolios. We account for the Titman and Tiu (2011) hedging effect by examining the relationship between the DCI and the R-square obtained from the Fung and Hsieh (2001) regressions. Finally, we explore the possibility of survivorship bias driving the previous findings. We find that our results are robust to all these additional tests.
Overall, our empirical results cast doubt on the presumption that pursuing a distinctive strategy leads to improved performance. Unique strategies seem to involve substantially higher levels of risk exposure without offering sufficiently higher returns, especially after taking into account funds' idiosyncratic characteristics. While some fund managers might be able to achieve higher risk-adjusted returns by timing the market return and/or liquidity, the practice of deviating from the style-group's consensus appears in itself to lead to deterioration in performance. This finding, along with the significantly positive relationship between the DCI and performance fees, also calls into question the perception that higher fees tend to be indicative of better fund performance.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the DCI and the intuition behind it. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics for the DCI. Section 4 discusses the empirical results on the relationship between strategy distinctiveness and fund performance. Section 5 describes the results of various robustness tests, while Section 6 concludes.
Dispersion Contribution Index (DCI)
In order to construct a meaningful measure of strategy distinctiveness at the level of the individual fund, we begin by quantifying distinctiveness at the aggregate level of the fund's cohort. In this context, the cross-sectional dispersion (CSD) of fund returns represents a natural candidate for a measure of heterogeneity at the aggregate level. We measure CSD as the mean absolute deviation of individual funds' returns from the mean return of all funds in a particular style group, as described in equation (1)
where r i,t is the return of fund i at time t, r G,t is the cross-sectional mean return at t of all funds in the same style group, and N is the number of funds in that group. Recent studies have been paying increasing attention to the cross-sectional dispersion of returns, for instance in the context of "herding" (Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Galariotis et al., 2015) and idiosyncratic risk (Angelidis et al., 2015; Verousis and Voukelatos, 2015) . Generally, CSD can serve as an economically meaningful measure of divergence of performance among assets at the aggregate level. By construction, CSD is bound from below at zero, which represents the hypothetical extreme case of all fund managers pursuing exactly the same strategy and, thus, earning exactly the same return. As managers pursue more distinctive strategies, the returns of individual funds will diverge more from the mean of the cohort and CSD will increase as a result. Given that CSD reflects the aggregate level of distinctiveness within a particular style group, we then proceed to measure strategy distinctiveness at the level of the individual fund as the contribution of that fund to the total level of aggregate dispersion of the group. To this end, we propose the Dispersion Contribution Index (DCI) as an intuitive measure of strategy distinctiveness, computed as follows
While CSD can be viewed as a measure of a cluster's "density" (i.e. how close together are the cluster's elements), the DCI represents a distance measure which reflects how far from the cluster's consensus ("centre") is a specific fund. In addition to its intuitive interpretation and ease of computation, the DCI has the advantage of being a relative measure of strategy distinctiveness, so that levels of DCI can be directly compared across funds irrespective of whether they belong to the same style group. More specifically, as an arithmetic average of absolute deviations, the CSD reflects the contribution of the average fund to the group's dispersion. By dividing the distance of a particular fund from the group's mean by the average distance, the DCI effectively translates into the distance of that fund from the consensus relative to the mean (expected) distance. For example, the mean DCI across all funds in a given style group is by construction equal to 1. Therefore, a fund with a DCI of 0.5 can be thought of as being away from its style group mean at half the distance that would have been expected on average, while a fund with a DCI of 2 can be thought of as being twice as far away than expected from the mean of its group. 6 
Data
We examine a sample of hedge funds from the BarclayHedge database, with the sample period spanning from January 1994 to August 2015. The BarclayHedge database reports, among other fields, the monthly returns of hedge funds and a large set of fund characteristics. Our initial dataset comprises 6,489 live and 16,478 graveyard funds, for a total of 22,967 unique funds. Similarly to previous studies, we apply several filters on this dataset. First, we exclude non-monthly filing funds and those with unknown strategies. Second, we drop funds denominated at any currency other than USD. We then exclude funds for which average assets under management (AUM) are below 5 million USD. Similarly to Sun et al. (2012), we filter out funds that have fewer than 12 observations in any given 24-month period and we control for backfill bias by dropping the first 18 monthly observations for each fund. Finally, we exclude funds of funds. The resulting post-filtering dataset comprises 9,533 unique funds, with 2,961 funds being alive at end of the sample period and 6,572 funds having been defunct at some point during that period.
BarclayHedge classifies hedge funds into 96 groups based on the primary strategy that they follow. Given that such a number of strategy groups is significantly high (for instance compared to the number of strategy groups typically examined in the related literature) and that clear similarities exist between the strategies of different groups, we follow the classification approach proposed by Joenvaara et al. (2014) and assign funds to 12 main style categories. These "mapped" strategy categories consist of CTA, emerging markets, event-driven, global macro, long-only, long-short, market-neutral, multi-strategy, relative value, sector, short-bias, and others. The most populated strategy groups are the long/short and sector, while the least populated one is the short bias group. Table 1 reports descriptive characteristics for the post-filtering sample of hedge funds for the period January 1994 to August 2015. Each column tabulates the time-series mean of a particular cross-sectional descriptive statistic (mean, median or standard deviation) for a given characteristic. The characteristics examined consist of the number of funds per period, the DCI computed using equation (2), the Sun et al. (2012) SDI, the 24-month volatility of returns, the fund's redemption notice and lock up period, a dummy variable for high watermark, the fund's management and performance fees (in percentages), age, AUM and leverage. Descriptives are tabulated separately for the full sample, as well as for the live and graveyard subsamples.
As has been previously discussed, the mean DCI is equal to 1 by default. However, the median DCI is found to be around 0.70 for both live and graveyard funds, which is substantially lower than the mean. The fact that the majority of funds exhibit a DCI that is lower than the expected value of 1, while a relatively small number of funds appear to follow very distinctive strategies, is also evidenced in the histogram of DCI presented in Figure 1 . The frequency distribution of DCI across all funds is characterized by a substantial level of positive skewness, and this is also the case when the histograms are produced separately for live and graveyard funds (unreported to conserve space). This significant asymmetry in the DCI distribution indicates that funds with strategies that are very distinctive from their style-group's consensus are relatively rare, while funds with strategies that appear to track the group's consensus are quite common. Although the relative scarcity of skilled fund managers who pursue unique strategies and the relative abundance of managers who follow the trend to a significant extent is not necessarily surprising, the magnitude of this asymmetry is somewhat large compared to previously reported findings (see, for instance, Sun et al., 2012).
[ Figure 1 around here]
In contrast, strategy distinctiveness seems to follow the opposite pattern when measured by the Sun et al. (2012) SDI in our sample. More specifically, the mean SDI exceeds the median level in the full sample and in the two subsamples of live and graveyard funds, suggesting a negatively skewed distribution of SDI. This difference provides some initial evidence about the fact that our proposed DCI measure carries information that is distinct from the existing SDI measure in terms of the extent to which a fund is likely to pursue a strategy that is unique among those employed by other funds in the same style group. We examine the incremental informational content of DCI relative to SDI (and relative to other alternative measures) in greater depth in Section 5.
the SDI i,t of fund i at time t using returns over the previous 24 months, as follows
In contrast to Sun et al. (2012), though, who follow Goetzmann (1997, 2003) to produce fund clusters, we assign funds to strategy groups according to the Joenvaara et al.
(2014) methodology.
4 Empirical Results

Performance measures
Our main focus is on understanding how hedge funds' strategy distinctiveness, as measured by DCI, relates to their performance. In order to form a comprehensive view of funds' performance, we examine their monthly returns (net of fees) as well as a set of commonly used performance measures. The first performance measure refers to the alpha obtained from the Fung and Hsieh (2001) 7-factor (FH) model. The FH model, arguably the most commonly used asset pricing model in the hedge fund literature, comprises 7 factors that have been shown to explain the cross-section of hedge fund returns better than the Capital Asset Pricing Model or other pricing models that have been traditionally used in the case of stocks. The 7 FH factors consist of a bond trend-following factor, a currency trend-following factor, a commodity trend-following factor, an equity market factor, a size spread factor, a bond market factor and a credit spread factor. 2 We measure the abnormal performance of a given fund at time t as the intercept from fitting the FH model using the past 24 months of that fund's returns. In order to obtain a time-series of FH alphas for each individual fund in the sample, we run the FH model on a rolling 24-month basis. Overall, the FH alpha measures a fund's risk-adjusted (or abnormal) return after accounting for the fund's exposure to a set of relevant risk factors.
Our second performance measure is a modification of the Treynor and Black (1973) Appraisal Ratio (AR). We compute a fund's AR at t by dividing the mean of its past 24 FH alphas by their standard deviation. Scaling alpha by its standard deviation produces a performance measure that captures abnormal returns in excess of exposure to a set of systematic risks, after also accounting for idiosyncratic risk. In this sense, the AR can serve as a more useful measure of hedge fund performance than the simple FH alpha, particularly since it mitigates problems stemming from survivorship bias (Sun et al., 2012) and it accounts for differences in leverage among different funds (Agarwal and Naik, 2000) .
Moreover, we evaluate fund performance by computing the Keating and Shadwick (2002) Omega measure. The Omega shifts the emphasis from the returns distribution variance, or its co-variance with the group's mean return, to downside risk. In particular, the Omega is computed based on the distribution's first Lower Partial Moment (LPM), and it is defined as
where L is a return threshold, F is the cumulative distribution function of the returns of fund i, and a and b are the upper and lower bounds of the returns distribution, respectively. We compute a fund's Omega at t using returns over the past 24 months and we set the threshold L equal to the risk-free rate (1-month T-bill rate). The Omega measures performance by focusing on returns below a certain threshold as a proxy for risk, and it is flexible in dealing with the nonnormal distributions of hedge fund returns.
We also compute the Sortino ratio as given in equation (4). Similarly to the Omega, the Sortino ratio is also a performance measure that adjusts mean returns for their level of downside risk. The main difference between the two is that the Omega is based on the first LPM while the Sortino ratio is based on the second LPM (Kaplan and Knowles, 2004) .
Our final measure of hedge fund performance is the Ingersoll et al. (2007) Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure (MPPM), given as
where K is the total number of observations used to compute the MPPM, r f,t is the risk-free rate at t, ∆t is the time interval between observations, and ρ can be viewed as a risk-aversion coefficient. When computing a fund's MPPM at t, we use the fund's past 24 monthly returns (K = 24 and ∆t = 1 12 ), and we follow Ingersoll et al. (2007) to set the risk-aversion parameter ρ equal to 3.
3 Ingersoll et al. (2007) suggest that the MPPM can be interpreted as the fund's excess return "certainty equivalent". Effectively, rather than adjusting returns according to their exposure to systematic factors, idiosyncratic risk or downside risk (like the previous measures), the MPPM is constructed so that it accounts for the possibility of fund managers trying to "game" traditional performance measures in order to appear more skilled than what they truly are.
DCI persistence and relationship with fund characteristics
If the DCI is to be considered a meaningful measure of strategy distinctiveness, it should exhibit some level of persistence over time. In this context, a manager who possesses unique skills and resources during a particular period would be expected to exhibit the same characteristics in the future. Moreover, a manager who pursues a unique strategy that proves to be profitable would also be expected to continue trading in that fashion in the future, at least until the uniqueness of that strategy in the market has been exhausted. At the other end of the spectrum, a manager with a low level of skills/resources who tends to invest as a trend-follower in a given period is likely to pursue non-unique strategies in future periods as well, consistently displaying low levels of DCI.
We examine the persistence of the DCI by looking at the differences in future DCI levels among portfolios that have been originally sorted by their DCI. More specifically, in each month, we sort all sample funds into five portfolios according to their lagged DCI. We then compute the mean DCI of each portfolio when held for the next 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. Whenever a fund ceases to trade during a particular holding period, it simply exits its respective portfolio so there is no look-ahead bias. Table 2 presents the mean DCI levels of these quintile portfolios at the time of sorting and across the different holding periods. We also report the difference between the mean DCI of the highest-DCI and lowest-DCI portfolios, and its respective t-statistic.
[ Table 2 around here]
At the time of sorting, the lowest quintile portfolio has a mean DCI of 0.13, while the highest quintile portfolio has a mean DCI of 2.69. Consistent with the positively skewed DCI distribution that was discussed earlier, the first three quintiles have mean levels of DCI below 1. Unsurprisingly, the difference between the mean DCI of the first and last quintile (2.56) is statistically significant at any meaningful significance level. More importantly, the persistence of the DCI is supported by the fact that the mean DCI levels of the quintile portfolios at the end of the holding period are still monotonically increasing, with this finding being consistent across all holding periods from 1 to 24 months. The difference between the DCI levels of the first and last quintile diminishes as the holding period increases, reaching a minimum of 0.62 for the holding period of 24 months, but all these DCI differences are highly statistically significant. Overall, these results are indicative of a significant persistence in the DCI, with funds that exhibit a low (high) DCI at a given period being more likely to have a low (high) DCI in subsequent periods.
Having established that the DCI is a relatively persistent measure, we proceed to examine the fund characteristics that might affect strategy distinctiveness. In particular, we estimate a panel regression of funds' DCI levels against lagged fund-specific characteristics, as given in equation (6) . The vector X of fund characteristics consists of the fund's volatility of returns during the previous 24 months, the redemption notice period, the lock up period, a dummy variable for high watermark, the management and performance fees (in percentages), the fund's age, AUM and leverage. Table 3 reports the results, with column II also incorporating the Sun et al. (2012) SDI as an additional regressor.
The DCI is found to be significantly positively related to a fund's return volatility, length of redemption period and length of lock up period. Furthermore, the DCI seems to increase with the fund's performance fee, suggesting that managers who are more skilled (and, thus, more likely to pursue distinctive strategies) tend to charge higher fees. However, the relationship between the DCI and the fund's management fee is statistically insignificant. Moreover, strategy distinctiveness is found to be higher for funds of higher age, lower AUM and higher leverage. The negative relationship between age and the DCI is potentially surprising, since we would have expected the managers of younger funds to be more flexible in pursuing unique strategies. The negative DCI-AUM relationship, though, is consistent with the intuition that smaller funds can be more flexible in adopting new innovative strategies compared to larger funds.
[ Table 3 around here] Interestingly, we find that the DCI is negatively and significantly related to the SDI measure of strategy distinctiveness in our sample. Considering the way in which the two measures for strategy distinctiveness are computed, this negative relationship suggests that the past correlation of a fund's returns with the mean return of its cohort is not a particularly good indicator of the distance of its return from the cohort's mean at a given point in time (or, rather, that it is a good indicator but with the opposite than expected sign). In other words, our results suggest that the return of a fund is more likely to diverge by a greater distance from the mean return of its style group at t (i.e. exhibit a higher DCI) if it has correlated strongly with that mean return over the previous period (i.e. exhibit a lower SDI). Intuitively, this negative DCI-SDI relationship indicates that the DCI is likely to provide incremental information about a fund's strategy distinctiveness compared to the information conveyed by the alternative SDI measure.
DCI and fund performance
In order to explore if strategy distinctiveness is related to hedge fund performance, we begin by looking at whether portfolios of funds with markedly different levels of DCI at a given point in time perform differently during subsequent periods. More specifically, we evaluate fund performance for portfolios rebalanced every 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. At the beginning of each rebalancing period, we sort all funds in our sample into quintile portfolios based on their DCI levels computed in the previous month. Within each portfolio, we compute the equally-weighted mean return (net of fees). This approach results in one time-series of returns per quintile portfolio, with the length of each time-series varying according to the length of the rebalancing period considered. Table 4 summarizes the mean returns offered by the above quintile portfolios. The first thing to notice is that, with few exceptions, returns increase monotonically with the portfolio's DCI. For example, at the shortest (monthly) rebalancing frequency, the lowest-DCI portfolio earns on average 0.75% per month while the highest-DCI portfolio earns 1.19% per month. Moreover, this relationship holds across all five rebalancing periods. Overall, these findings seem to support the hypothesis that funds that pursue more distinctive strategies, as measured by their DCI, tend to outperform their less distinctive peers.
[ Table 4 around here]
To put the return differential between funds with different levels of DCI into perspective, we also report the mean return (and associated t-statistic) of a spread portfolio that goes long in the highest-DCI funds of the last quintile and short in the lowest-DCI funds of the first quintile. We find that this zero-cost portfolio, termed P5-P1, offers a statistically significant and economically large mean return which, for instance in the case of monthly rebalancing, is approximately equal to 0.43% per month. The mean return of the spread portfolio seems to be somewhat decreasing as the length of the rebalancing period increases, potentially as a result of differences in the DCI between portfolios becoming less pronounced as funds remain for longer periods inside particular portfolios without rebalancing to account for relative changes in their DCI. However, P5-P1 returns are quite large even in the longest rebalancing period that we consider (24 months), where the zero-cost spread portfolio is found to earn a mean 0.24% per month (t-statistic is 3.08).
Even though the results reported in Table 4 suggest that funds with more distinctive strategies tend to offer higher returns, these returns need to be evaluated against the funds' exposure to risk in order to understand how strategy distinctiveness relates to overall fund performance. To this end, Table 5 reports the performance measures discussed in subsection 4.1 for the five DCI-sorted portfo-lios across the five different rebalancing periods. We also report the performance of the P5-P1 spread portfolio and the respective t-statistics. Due to the nonnormality of fund performance, we use bootstrapped error bounds on the empirical distribution of each performance measure. In particular, in each case we obtain 1,000 non-parametric bootstrapped samples by sampling with replacement from the time-series of a particular performance measure. We then compute standard errors based on the distribution of these bootstrapped samples.
[ Table 5 around here]
As can be seen from Panel A, the FH alpha increases monotonically as the DCI increases for portfolios 2 to 5, although the alpha of the first (lowest-DCI) portfolio is found to be higher than those of the medium-DCI portfolios 2 to 4. Importantly, going long in funds with the most distinctive strategies (last quintile) and short in funds with the least distinctive strategies (first quintile) results in positive and highly significant alphas. For instance, the P5-P1 spread portfolio offers an alpha of 0.20% per month under monthly rebalancing, with FH alphas increasing as the rebalancing period increases. In general, funds that pursue more distinctive strategies appear to offer higher risk-adjusted returns, i.e. perform better after accounting for their exposure to a set of relevant systematic risks, compared to funds with less distinctive strategies. This result is consistent with the findings reported by Sun et al. (2012) using the SDI to proxy for strategy distinctiveness.
However, this positive relationship between strategy distinctiveness and fund performance (when the latter is measured by returns or alphas) is not supported by the results obtained when we examine alternative performance measures. Panel B of Table 5 reports the AR of the five sorted portfolios and the spread P5-P1 portfolio. In sharp contrast to the results reported in Table 4 (returns) and Panel A of Table 5 (FH alphas), the AR is found to be monotonically decreasing with the DCI. This negative relationship is robust across all rebalancing periods, and the AR of the P5-P1 portfolio is significantly negative and economically large. The finding that the DCI is positively related with returns and alphas but negatively related with the AR seems to suggest that managers who pursue more distinctive strategies earn larger returns without being exposed to higher levels of systematic risk, but these higher returns come at the cost of much higher levels of idiosyncratic risk.
This finding provides evidence against the Sun et al. (2012) "skills hypothesis" which postulates that unskilled managers are more likely to take on higher levels of idiosyncratic risk while skilled managers are more likely to pursue unique strategies that enhance performance without the need of excessive idiosyncratic risk. Based on the DCI measure, we find that managers who are more skilled (in the sense 14 of pursuing more distinctive strategies) tend to avoid excessive systematic risk but still load substantially more on idiosyncratic risk, thereby increasing alpha but decreasing the AR. This relationship is further supported by the significantly negative coefficient of return volatility on the DCI reported in Table 3 .
4
Panels C and D of Table 5 report the respective results from measuring performance by the Omega and Sortino ratios, respectively. Similarly to the results from the AR, the Omega and the Sortino ratios are found to be generally decreasing as we move from the lowest-DCI to the highest-DCI portfolio, across the different rebalancing periods. Moreover, the Omega and the Sortino ratios of the spread P5-P1 portfolios are negative and statistically significant in all cases (with the exception of a negative but insignificant Sortino ratio under the longest 24-month rebalancing period). Given that both metrics measure fund performance relative to the Lower Partial Moments of the returns' distribution, our results suggest that performance deteriorates as strategy distinctiveness increases because of an increasing level of downside risk. This result runs, again, contrary to what might have been expected, since it indicates that it is in fact the skilled fund managers (rather than the unskilled ones) who might be exploiting the option-like feature of their compensation contracts by increasing downside risk in the hope of achieving substantially high returns.
Finally, Panel E of Table 5 reports the results from measuring performance using the MPPM. Although the relationship between the DCI and the MPPM does not appear to be strictly monotonic, funds in the lowest-DCI portfolio perform consistently better than funds in the highest-DCI portfolio. For example, under monthly rebalancing the mean MPPM of the P5-P1 spread portfolio is -0.04, with a t-statistic of -7.28. The MPPMs of the spread portfolios are negative across all five rebalancing periods, although their magnitude decreases as the length of the rebalancing period increases and they become statistically insignificant for the longest 12-month and 24-month periods. As has been previously mentioned, the MPPM is intended to control for fund managers potentially "gaming" other performance measures in order to artificially boost performance. In this context, the MPPM results indicate that skilled managers who pursue distinctive strategies actually deliver inferior performance to the funds' investors after accounting for risk and assuming a reasonable level of risk aversion.
Overall, our results suggest that the relationship between strategy distinctiveness and hedge fund performance is not as straightforward as has been reported in previous studies. Managers who have the skills and resources to pursue distinctive strategies are indeed found to earn returns that are on average higher compared to less distinct-strategy funds, even after adjusting for their exposure to the most commonly used systematic risk factors. However, these skilled managers seem to achieve higher returns and alphas by taking on higher levels of idiosyncratic and downside risk, with overall performance actually being worse, as a result, compared to their less distinctive peers.
We employ the standard Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-pass methodology to further explore the relationship between fund performance and strategy distinctiveness. More specifically, we run the following cross-sectional regression in each month
where perf i is the value of a particular performance measure for fund i, DCI i is the level of the fund's DCI on that month, and X i is a vector of fund characteristics lagged by one period. The X vector comprises the same fund characteristics examined in Table 3 , namely the SDI, return volatility, redemption notice, lock up period, dummy variable for high watermark, management fee, performance fee, age, AUM, and leverage. In addition to the fund characteristics in X, we also include strategy dummy variables in the cross-sectional regressions to control for the funds' different styles. At the second stage, we use the time-series of the estimated coefficients to obtain the mean loading of the performance measure on each characteristic and to determine its statistical significance. Statistical inference is based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Table 6 reports the Fama-MacBeth second stage mean coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets), tabulated separately for each performance measure (return, alpha, AR, Omega, Sortino and MPPM). Consistent with our findings from the DCIsorted portfolios, the Fama-MacBeth results are against the hypothesis of strategy distinctiveness being associated with superior performance. First, when funds' other characteristics are taken into account, returns are found to be negatively associated with the DCI, albeit with a statistically insignificant coefficient. This finding casts doubt on the previously reported positive relationship between returns and the DCI found in the sorted portfolios, suggesting that it probably stems from funds' other characteristics rather than from a fundamentally positive returns-DCI relationship. Similarly, FH alphas are found to be significantly negatively related to the DCI after controlling for fund characteristics, in contrast to the previous finding of portfolios' alphas increasing with their DCI level. The Fama-MacBeth mean coefficient of the DCI on alpha is negative (-0.06%) and sta-tistically significant (t-stat is -5.16), suggesting that funds with a lower DCI earn higher risk-adjusted returns compared to funds that have a higher DCI but are comparable in terms of other characteristics.
[ Table 6 around here] Moreover, the results from the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the AR, Omega and Sortino ratio are consistent with the respective results from the sorted portfolios. All three performance measures are found to be negatively and significantly related to the DCI, supporting the hypothesis that funds which pursue more distinctive strategies tend to perform worse than their less distinctive peers after accounting for the various fund characteristics and adjusting for risk. The only exception to this consistent pattern of significantly negative DCI coefficients on performance measures is the MPPM, for which the respective coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. Overall, the Fama-MacBeth results stand in stark contrast to the hypothesis of strategy distinctiveness being positively related to performance. When we account for an extensive set of funds' idiosyncratic characteristics, all the performance measures examined (except for the MPPM) are significantly negatively related to the funds' DCI levels, indicating that pursuing a distinctive strategy decreases performance relative to funds with similar characteristics but with a lower level of strategy distinctiveness.
Robustness
Controlling for the SDI
In order for our proposed DCI to be considered a meaningful measure of strategy distinctiveness, we need to show that it has informational content in excess of that contained in alternative measures, the most commonly adopted of which is arguably the Sun et al. (2012) SDI. Furthermore, the negative relationship between strategy distinctiveness and performance that was previously documented would be a novel finding only if it persists after accounting for such an alternative distinctiveness measure.
The Fama-MacBeth results that were discussed in the previous section provide some initial evidence supporting the hypothesis that the DCI constitutes a measure that is distinct from the existing SDI, since the various performance measures were found to be significantly negatively related to funds' DCI levels after accounting for their respective SDI levels. In order to explore the incremental informational content of the DCI further, we proceed to examine the performance of portfolios of funds that have been double-sorted on SDI and DCI. In each month, we begin by sorting all funds in quintiles according to their SDI. Then, inside each SDI-based quintile we further sort the funds in quintiles according to their DCI. Finally, the monthly returns of the DCI-based quintiles are averaged across the SDI-based quintiles, thus reflecting the returns of portfolios with homogeneous SDI levels but across different levels of DCI. This two-way sort is repeated every month, resulting in a time-series of portfolio returns across the five DCI-based portfolios. The double-sorting has the advantage of ensuring that the final quintile portfolios have comparable mean levels of SDI and are only expected to differ in terms of their DCI levels. Table 7 reports the returns and performance measures, along with the associated t-statistics, of the respective P5-P1 spread portfolios under double-sorting. The main thing to notice is that the results are very similar to those obtained in Tables 4 and 5 , when funds had been sorted only on their DCI levels. Going long in the highest-DCI funds and short in the lowest-DCI ones, and simultaneously ensuring that the position is neutral with respect to the SDI, is found to offer positive returns and FH alphas which are statistically significant in most cases. Furthermore, all the other performance measures take negative values across all rebalancing periods, and they are consistently statistically significant (with the only exception of the Sortino ratio under 24-month rebalancing). In other words, funds with more distinctive strategies, according to their DCI, tend to perform worse than their peers with less distinctive strategies, even when they are characterized by the same SDI levels. Overall, these results confirm that the proposed DCI captures funds' strategy distinctiveness in a way that is substantially different to the commonly used SDI.
[ Table 7 around here] Cao et al. (2013) show that skilled managers can improve fund performance by timing market liquidity and adjusting their funds' exposure to the market accordingly. Given that strategy distinctiveness is directly related to managers' skills, we examine if market liquidity timing skills could potentially explain the previously reported relationship between the DCI and fund performance. We follow Cao et al. (2013) and regress fund returns against a set of systematic factors and an interaction term between liquidity changes and the market return, given in equation (8) 
Market timing
r i t = α i + β i F F t + β i L M KT t ∆L t + i t(8)
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where r i t is the return of fund i at t, F t is a vector of the values of the seven Hung and Hsieh (2001) factors, M KT t is the excess return of the market (also included in F t ), and ∆L t is the first difference of a market liquidity factor. 5 The Cao et al. (2013) timing model applies to equity-oriented funds, so we exclude funds with strategies that are not associated with equities (see also Sun et al., 2015). We run the time-series regression in (8) separately for each fund. The β i L coefficient of the interaction term can be considered as a measure of a fund manager's skills in timing the market liquidity, with larger values indicating a greater timing ability, since the fund would exhibit a higher market beta during good market conditions (i.e. during periods with higher market liquidity).
After computing managers' timing skills, we then double-sort funds in portfolios according to their β i L and DCI, similarly to the previous subsection. The resulting double-sorted portfolios are constructed so that they vary in terms of their DCI levels without being overpopulated by funds that exhibit particularly low or high ability to time market liquidity. Panel A of Table 8 reports the returns and performance measures of the P5-P1 portfolios under this double-sorting. Our results suggest that market liquidity timing skills seem to be, to an extent, related to our previous findings on the relationship between DCI and fund performance. More specifically, the spread P5-P1 portfolios are still found to earn positive returns and significantly negative AR, Omega, and Sortino ratios across all five rebalancing periods, similarly to the results previously reported. However, under double-sorting with market liquidity timing skills, FH alphas become negative (and statistically significant for rebalancing periods up to 6 months) while MPPMs become significantly positive.
[ Table 8 around here] Chen and Liang (2007) demonstrate that funds which self-report following market timing strategies indeed show significant ability to time US market returns, especially during up markets. In order to explore the potential effect of the ability to time market returns on our results, we follow Chen and Liang (2007) and measure the respective timing skills of fund managers as the β i M of the following regression
Higher values of β i M are indicative of a greater market-timing ability. After computing managers' skills to time market returns for equity-oriented funds, we double-sort funds in portfolios according to their timing ability and their DCI. Panel B of Table 8 reports the performance of the resulting spread portfolios across different rebalancing periods. The results are very similar to those obtained from accounting for the manager's ability to time market liquidity (reported in Panel A), with positive but mostly insignificant returns, significantly negative alphas, AR, Omega and Sortino ratios, and significantly positive MPPMs.
Overall, these results seem to suggest that the initially reported superior alphas earned by funds with more distinctive strategies can be, at least partially, attributed to managers' timing skills. Once we account for exposure to systematic factors and the ability to time the market return and/or liquidity, equity-oriented funds with the highest (lowest) DCI levels are found to earn the lowest (highest) returns. This negative relationship between strategy distinctiveness and fund performance is further supported by the AR, Omega, and Sortino ratios. However, the results from the MPPM are in the opposite direction, suggesting a positive relationship between the DCI and performance for this subset of hedge funds.
Sorting on the mean DCI
One of the advantages of the DCI as a measure of strategy distinctiveness is that its value for a particular fund at t only requires a cross-section of comparable fund returns at that time to be computed. As a result, and given the substantial DCI persistence discussed in subsection 4.2, we do not need to measure strategy distinctiveness at t using data from an arbitrarily selected previous period. In the interest of robustness, though, we examine if using a short-term mean DCI as a distinctiveness measure (instead of the point estimate) produces different results. Table 9 reports the results from using the DCI mean computed over the previous 2, 3 and 6 months.
6 Panel A tabulates the returns and performance measures of the P5-P1 spread portfolios, while Panel B tabulates the coefficients of the DCI from the Fama-MacBeth regressions in (7). Our results are very similar to those obtained when the point estimate of DCI is used, with the spread portfolios earning significantly positive returns and FH alphas, and significantly negative AR, Omega, Sortino and MPPM performance measures. Also, all performance measures have negative and (almost always) statistically significant Fama-MacBeth loadings on the DCI. Moreover, these results are consistent across mean levels of the DCI computed in periods of different length. Overall, our finding that funds with less distinctive strategies tend to outperform their more distinctive peers does not appear to be driven by potential noise from computing the DCI as a point estimate.
[ Table 9 around here]
Alternative groupings of funds
In this subsection, we re-examine the relationship between the DCI and performance using the original BarclayHedge classification of hedge funds into 96 strategy groups. Even though this number of style groups is arguably too large, the BarclayHedge classification is nevertheless readily available and it could perhaps highlight important differences between niche fund markets. The results based on the original BarclayHedge style groups, reported in Panel A of Table 10 , are very similar to those obtained under the Joenvaara et al. (2014) classification.
[ Table 10 around here] First, the returns and FH alphas of the P5-P1 spread portfolios are positive and statistically significant across the five rebalancing periods, while the ARs are significantly negative. The downside risk measures (Omega and Sortino) and the MPPM are significantly negative for the shorter rebalancing periods and insignificant for the longer ones. Second, the Fama-MacBeth regressions indicate that the loadings of the performance measures on the DCI are significantly negative, except for the MPPM.
In addition to basing the style groups on funds' self-reporting, i.e. using the original BarclayHedge or the Joenvaara et al. (2014) classifications, we also group funds according to the relative proximity of their historical returns. More specifically, we assign funds in 10 groups following the k-means clustering procedure. First developed by MacQueen (1967), the k-means procedure groups elements into clusters by minimizing the sum of Euclidian distances of all elements from their respective group means (see Brown and Goetzmann, 1997, and Sun et al., 2012, for a more detailed discussion of k-means clustering). The resulting clusters are not affected by the way in which funds self-report their own strategies, but they are solely driven by the funds' actual performance history.
The results, presented in Panel B of Table 10 , are again very similar to those obtained under the Joenvaara et al. (2014) classification. Portfolios with higher DCI levels are found to offer significantly higher returns and alphas but significantly lower AR, Omega and Sortino ratios, while the differences in the MPPM are mostly insignificant. Also, the performance measures are significantly negatively related to the DCI in the Fama-MacBeth regressions, with the exception of an insignificant loading in the case of the MPPM. Overall, these results confirm that the previously reported negative relationship between strategy distinctiveness and performance measures is not simply an artefact of the specific way in which we group funds.
Value-weighted portfolios
Our previous results were based on equally-weighing funds within particular portfolios. We repeat the analyses by value-weighing funds instead. On each calendar month, the returns (and associated performance measures) are computed assuming that each fund enters a portfolio at a weight proportional to its AUM on that month relative to the portfolio's total AUM. Table 11 reports the resulting returns and performance measures of the P5-P1 value-weighted spread portfolios across the five rebalancing periods.
[ Table 11 around here] It appears that the weighing scheme does not affect the main relationship of interest. Going long in a value-weighted portfolio with the highest DCI and short in the portfolio with the lowest DCI is still found to offer significantly positive returns and alphas. However, consistent with our previous results, funds with the highest strategy distinctiveness considerably underperform relative to their least distinctive peers in terms of AR, Omega, Sortino and MPPM, with the spread performance measures being statistically significant across most of the rebalancing periods.
The hedging effect
Titman and Tiu (2011) demonstrate that fund managers who maintain lower exposures to factor risk are more likely to deliver superior performance. In our context of strategy distinctiveness, this finding could be interpreted as more skilled fund managers tending to pursue superior performance through the implementation of more distinctive strategies rather than as compensation for simply bearing higher systematic risk. We follow Titman and Tiu (2011) and measure a fund's exposure to systematic risk at t as the R-square obtained from regressing the fund's returns over the previous 24 months against the 7 Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. If a fund manager's propensity to seek exposure to systematic risk is indeed related to the fund's distinctiveness from its peer group, we would expect the DCI to be negatively correlated with the R-square or, alternatively, positively correlated with 1 minus the R-square (see also Sun et al., 2012).
We examine the relationship between strategy distinctiveness and the Titman and Tiu (2011) "hedging effect" in two ways. First, we sort funds into quintiles according to their DCI levels, as before. Then, we sort all funds according to their 1 − R 2 measure, independently from the first sort. Finally, we compute the proportion of funds that simultaneously fall in a particular DCI quintile and a particular 1 − R 2 quintile, for all 25 possible quintile combinations. If strategy distinctiveness is independent from the hedging effect, we would expect a uniform overlap among quintiles, with each quintile combination representing roughly 1 25 = 4% of the total sample of funds. On the other hand, if strategy distinctiveness is associated with a lack of need for exposure to systematic risk, we would expect quintile combinations that are equally low (or equally high) in DCI and 1 − R 2 to be populated by more funds compared to low-high combinations.
Panel A of Table 12 reports the proportion of funds that falls under each of the 25 quintile combinations. This proportion seems to be distributed in a consistently uniform way, with each quintile combination being populated by approximately 4% of funds. For instance, the least populated combination includes 3.79% of all funds, while the most populated one includes 4.12% of funds. Furthermore, none of the proportions is found to be statistically different from the 4% threshold at any meaningful significance level. In other words, no discernible pattern is detected between the DCI and the hedging effect, in contrast to a non-trivial overlap between the SDI and 1 − R 2 reported by Sun et al. (2012).
[ Table 12 around here]
Our second test involves examining the performance of funds that have been double-sorted according to their DCI and 1 − R 2 . Similarly to the double sorts discussed in previous subsections, these portfolios are constructed so that they vary in terms of the DCI levels while having similar levels of 1 − R 2 . Panel B of Table  12 reports the returns and performance measures of the P5-P1 spread portfolios under this double-sorting. The results are broadly similar to those reported thus far. More specifically, more distinctive funds with higher levels of DCI seem to offer higher returns than funds with lower DCI levels, although the difference is statistically significant only for the shortest 1-month rebalancing period. However, higher-DCI funds underperform considerably compared to their less distinctive peers after accounting for risk, with the spread portfolios being associated with negative (but mostly insignificant) alphas and significantly negative AR, Omega, and Sortino ratios. The main exception to these results' similarities with those in the initial analysis refers to the significantly positive MPPMs obtained under double-sorting with 1 − R 2 .
Survivorship bias
Our dataset contains both live and graveyard funds, so we would expect any concerns related to survivorship bias not to be particularly pronounced. However, it could still be the case that funds which drop out of the sample because they stop reporting while still trading earn markedly different returns compared to funds which stay in the sample. In order to make sure that our findings are not driven by differences between live funds and graveyard funds that still operate, we examine the survivorship ratios among the five DCI-sorted quintile portfolios. More specifically, Table 13 reports the survivorship ratios for each portfolio over the 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months post-formation. We also report the difference in survivorship ratios between the highest-DCI portfolio P5 and the lowest-DCI portfolio P1, and their associated t-statistics. The differences between survivorship ratios are found to generally increase as the period for which survivorship is computed increases. Furthermore, the majority of these differences are statistically significant, while the P5-P1 differences are always significant. However, the actual magnitude of these differences is very small (ranging from 0.20% to 1.59%), suggesting that the probability of a fund exiting the sample is not related to its DCI in a substantial way. Overall, these results confirm that the previously reported relationship between the DCI and fund performance is unlikely to be driven by survivorship bias.
[ Table 13 around here]
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new measure for the distinctiveness of a hedge fund's strategy. This measure, which we label Dispersion Contribution Index (DCI), is based on the distance between a fund's return and the mean return offered by funds in the same style-group. Using this new measure, we focus on the relationship between strategy distinctiveness and fund performance.
Our empirical findings cast doubt on the perception that funds with unique strategies outperform their less distinctive peers. We examine a large sample of hedge funds during 1994-2015 and find that, after accounting for various sources of risk and for a set of idiosyncratic characteristics, funds with the most distinctive strategies offer the worst performance. At the other end of the spectrum, funds that deviate the least from the consensus of their cohort are found to offer the highest risk-adjusted returns.
These findings challenge the commonly held view that higher performance fees are justified in order to invest in hedge funds that are more actively managed by skilled managers pursuing more distinctive strategies. It might well be the case that more skilled managers seek to achieve elevated performance in ways that are distinctive from the ideas implemented by their peers. However, these distinctive strategies seem to come at a significant cost to investors, both in terms of risk exposure and higher fees. Notes: This Table examines The fund characteristics are lagged by one period. We report the estimated coefficients for the DCI and the associated t-statistics. In both Panels, the analysis is done separately using the mean DCI computed over 2, 3 and 6 months. The sample runs from January 1994 to August 2015. Table examines The regression is estimated separately for each performance measure, across the measures described above. The fund characteristics are lagged by one period. We report the estimated coefficients for the DCI and the associated t-statistics. The sample runs from January 1994 to August 2015. Table reports Table reports the survivorship ratios of funds when sorted in quintile portfolios according to their DCI . Survival at t is measured by whether a given fund exits the sample permanently at that time. We tabulate the mean survivorship ratios across the five portfolios, and the difference between the ratios of the highest DCI and the lowest DCI quintiles (and their associated t-statistics). The results are reported separately for survival periods of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. The sample runs from January 1994 to August 2015.
